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          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3175 
___________ 
 
JAMIL GANDY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MS. SASHA REEDER, Correction Guard; LT. G. S. ROBINSON, III, Correction Guard;  
 MS. MCKELVEY, 1 Name Unknown, Correction Guard 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-05126) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 2, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 20, 2019) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se Appellant Jamil Gandy appeals the District Court’s order granting the 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm.   
I. 
Gandy, a state prisoner, brought this action in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging several constitutional violations.  The claim at issue in this appeal is based 
on Gandy’s allegation that Appellees Reeder and McKelvey, both correctional officers, 
violated the Eighth Amendment by disclosing his medical condition and treatment for 
mental health issues to prison employees and other inmates.1  Specifically, Gandy alleged 
that, for three years, the Appellees called him crazy, a “loony toon,” and spread rumors 
about his mental health.  According to Gandy, these insults and disclosure led to 
humiliation, harassment, anxiety, and even caused him to fear for his “untimely death.”  
Gandy’s grievances about the Appellees’ conduct were unsuccessful.   
The Appellees filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which the 
District Court granted.  It determined that Gandy had not stated a viable claim.  Although 
the District Court did not look favorably upon the alleged behavior, it concluded that 
such conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation.  Nor, thought the District 
                                              
1 In his complaint, Gandy also brought a Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate 
investigation of his grievances.  The District Court dismissed that claim, when it granted 
the Appellees’ motion to dismiss.  In his briefs, Gandy does not challenge the District 
Court’s dismissal of this claim, and we do not consider it here.  See United States v. 
Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 175 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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Court, did the complaint plausibly allege that the Appellees knew of and disregarded an 
excessive risk to Gandy’s health or safety.  Gandy timely appealed.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Gen. Ceramics Inc. v. 
Firemen’s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1995).  We exercise plenary review 
over a decision to grant a motion to dismiss.  See Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 
F.3d 410, 415 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded 
allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan 
v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  To withstand a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
III. 
The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, 
forbids the imposition of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency.”  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).  A 
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he is deliberately indifferent to an 
inmate’s health or safety, and when this act or omission results in the denial of “the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
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834 (1994).  Therefore, a prison official can be held liable if he knows that an inmate 
faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 
reasonable measures to abate it.  Id. at 847.  In order to establish a cognizable Eighth 
Amendment claim, a prisoner is required to allege “more than ordinary lack of due care 
for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).   
The District Court was correct in its decision to grant the Appellees’ motion to 
dismiss as to Gandy’s Eighth Amendment claim.  As noted, Gandy alleged that the 
Appellees disclosed his medical information to prison staff and other inmates, and called 
him crazy and a “loony toon.”2  We agree with those courts that have held that mere 
insults, without more, cannot constitute as an Eighth Amendment violation.  See McBride 
v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001).  Although we certainly agree with the 
District Court that the conduct alleged by Gandy is unprofessional and worthy of 
condemnation, it was not objectively serious enough to sustain a finding that the Eighth 
Amendment was violated.  See, e.g., Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468 (3d Cir. 2018).  
Gandy also alleged that the Appellees’ actions exposed him to risk of injury.  But, 
as the District Court suggested, Gandy did not provide enough detail to make a plausible 
claim.  Indeed, Gandy has put forth essentially a conclusory allegation that he feared for 
                                              
2 Before issuing a briefing schedule, the Clerk instructed the parties to address whether 
Gandy’s complaint viably alleged a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim.  See Doe v. 
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 323 (3d Cir. 2001).  Gandy did not brief that question, so we do not 
consider it further.  
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his “untimely death.”  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive motion to dismiss).  Simply putting 
forth an allegation of generalized fear is not enough to plead an Eighth Amendment 
claim.  Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining that a prisoner must he show that prison 
officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”).  Furthermore, nothing in 
Gandy’s allegations suggest that the Appellees acted with anything “more than ordinary 
lack of due care for [his] interests or safety.”  Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.  In this regard, 
we note, Gandy did not allege that the Appellees failed to intervene when other inmates 
harassed him, or even that they were aware that he faced a substantial risk of serious 
harm.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.  Thus, Gandy failed to state an Eighth Amendment 
claim upon which relief could be granted.3  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4     
 
 
                                              
3 Under the circumstances of this case, we perceive no reversible error in the District 
Court’s failure to permit Gandy to amend his complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  We note that prior to briefing, the Clerk of this 
Court directed the parties brief the question of amendment.  Gandy, however, did not 
argue that question and, indeed, pointed to no allegation that he had failed to bring in his 
original complaint.  
 
4 Gandy’s “Motion to Enter Judgment in Favor of Appellant and for Full Remand to the 
District Court” is denied.  
